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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, :' 
v. : Case No. 950337-CA 
EDGARDO MENDOZA : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of 
the Utah Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) 
(Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does the plaintiff's failure to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings of fact require this Court 
to assume those findings to be correct? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The factual findings underlying the 
trial court's conclusions will not be set aside unless they are 
clearly erroneous." State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah 
App. 1995) (quoting State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990). See also Marshall v. Marshall. 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah 
App. 1996); State v. Chavez. 840 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah App. 1992), 
Certt denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
2. Did the imposition of a "fine" by a prison disciplinary 
hearing, for the purpose of recouping the costs of the hearing 
and investigation in this matter, constitute punishment such that 
the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution 
prohibits the plaintiff's being charged with criminal misconduct 
concerning the same incident? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's conclusions of law 
are reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994); State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 39-40 (Utah App. 
1995) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. V. 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process of law 
and just compensation clauses] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment 
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land and naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War 
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use without just compensation. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-33 (1996) Restitution for offenses. 
Following an administrative hearing, the department is 
authorized to require restitution from an offender for expenses 
incurred by the department as a result of the offender's 
violation of department rules. The department is authorized to 
require payment from the offender's account or to place a hold on 
it to secure compliance with this section. 
(While currently found'in the 1996 Replacement Volume, this 
statute has remained the same since 1985) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 15, 1994, Edgardo Mendoza was charged, by 
information, with Assault on a Correctional Officer, a Class A 
Misdemeanor. R. 1-2. On February 27, 1995, the defendant filed 
a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that this prosecution was barred by 
his prior prison disciplinary hearing on the basis of double 
jeopardy. R. 21-3 0. 
The motion was denied by the trial court, which entered its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on May 8, 1995. R. 58-61. 
Mendoza filed a petition for permission to appeal this 
interlocutory order on May 25, 1995. R. 76-87. Permission was 
granted by Order of June 22, 1995. R. 75. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On August 7, 1994, Mendoza is alleged to have assaulted a 
correctional officer at the Utah State Prison by throwing a 
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substance, thought to be fecal matter and urine, at the officer. 
R. 1-2. This alleged misconduct also resulted in Mendoza being 
disciplined by the Utah State Department of Corrections. While 
no actual evidence was presented by the defendant concerning the 
prison disciplinary hearing, the State of Utah did not dispute 
the claims made by Mendoza that the defendant had been found 
guilty in the prison disciplinary of "Assault with Body Fluid" 
and ordered to pay a $200.00 "fine" and serve 30 days of 
"punitive isolation." R. 22, 31. 
The only evidence presented to the trial court was the 
Affidavit of Terry Bartlett, the Director of Institutional 
Operations for the Utah Department of Corrections. R. 45-47. 
In his affidavit, Mr. Bartlett testified that the fines 
assessed in prison disciplinaries are "generally nominal (no more 
than $200.00) and go towards reimbursing the prison the costs of 
the hearing, including investigation costs when applicable. 
Additional monetary amounts may be charged to the inmate to 
reimburse the prison for property damage or related costs. R. 
46. 
Mr. Bartlett also testified that such monetary judgments and 
punitive isolation served "to encourage proper inmate behavior 
and rehabilitate the inmate." R. 46 
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The Utah State Department of Corrections has been expressly 
authorized by statute to require offenders to pay restitution to 
the Department for expenses incurred as a result of the 
offenders' violation of department rules. Utah Code Ann. § 64-
13-33 (1996) (the actual language of the statute is unchanged 
since 1985) . 
In its findings of fact, the trial court expressly found 
that the "fine" assessed against Mendoza, following a prison 
disciplinary hearing, went towards "reimbursing the prison the 
costs of the hearing, including investigation costs when 
applicable." R. 59-60. The court also entered findings of fact 
that such "fines" and punitive isolation served to "encourage 
proper inmate behavior" and to rehabilitate inmates. R. 60. A 
further finding of fact by the trial court was that the "fine" of 
$200.00 at issue in this action was not "grossly disproportionate 
to the prison's remedial goals." R. 60. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Having failed to marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings, Mendoza cannot challenge the same and 
this Court should assume that the findings are supported by the 
record. 
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The $200 "fine" at question was remedial in nature. It was 
imposed to help pay for the administrative process that was 
required in response to the plaintiff's violation of the prison's 
rules. No evidence was presented to. show that the amount of $200 
was grossly disproportionate to the cost to the State of Utah of 
holding such a hearing and investigating the misconduct of the 
plaintiff. The ordered restitution amount of $200 is allowed by 
statute and approximates the actual costs of the State. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MENDOZA HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT - WHICH SHOULD THEREFORE BE 
ASSUMED SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
In arguing that the imposition of a fine by a prison 
disciplinary hearing constitutes punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes, Mendoza has ignored the findings of fact entered by the 
trial court. The trial court expressly found that the "fine" in 
this matter did no more than reimburse the state for the expenses 
of the disciplinary hearing and the costs of investigation. The 
court also found that the monetary judgment served a remedial 
purpose in promoting inmate rehabilitation and obedience to the 
rules of the prison. 
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Mendoza presented no evidence in the trial court, he did not 
oppose or in any manner seek to challenge the undisputed evidence 
submitted in the trial court by the Utah Department of 
Corrections. He does not marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's Findings of Facts in his opening brief. Mendoza 
> 
does not seek to show in any manner that the evidence in the 
record is insufficient to support the trial court's Findings of 
Fact. For this reason, this Court should assume that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court. Marshall v. Marshall. 
915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1996) ("We will uphold the trial 
court's findings of fact if a party fails to appropriately 
marshal all of the evidence."); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 
1119 (Utah App. 1995). 
Because Mendoza has not marshaled the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings of fact, and has not shown how the 
evidence of record is insufficient to support the trial court's 
factual findings, this Court should assume "that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court" and proceed "to the 
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law 
and the application of that law in the case." Saunders v. Sharp, 
806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
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II. THE MONETARY JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST 
MENDOZA BY THE PRISON DISCIPLINARY HEARING 
WAS NOT PUNISHMENT FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
PURPOSES BECAUSE IT DID NO MORE THAN 
COMPENSATE THE STATE FOR THE EXPENSES OF THE 
HEARING AND ASSOCIATED INVESTIGATION 
Mendoza's only claim on appeal is that the imposition of a 
$200.00 sanction (for the purpose of reimbursing the state for 
the expense of the disciplinary hearing and associated 
investigation) constitutes punishment under the double jeopardy 
clause of the United States Constitution, such that the present 
criminal prosecution is barred. Mendoza claims that any monetary 
sanction imposed in a prison disciplinary hearing is punishment. 
Defendant's claim fails because the imposition of a monetary 
sanction that is roughly related to compensating the government 
for its losses (including the costs of investigations and 
proceedings) is remedial, and not punitive, in nature. 
It is undisputed that the question before this Court is 
whether the monetary sanction imposed on Mendoza rises to the 
level of a multiple punishment for the same offense. In United 
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), the United States Supreme 
Court once again held that a civil fine could be either punitive 
or remedial in nature. The Court, reviewing its prior decisions 
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on this question, explained that a civil fine was remedial if it 
sought to reimburse the government for its actual losses. 
The relevant teaching of these cases is that 
the Government is entitled to rough remedial 
justice, that is, it may demand compensation 
according to somewhat imprecise formulas, 
such as reasonable liquidated damages or a 
fixed sum plus double damages, without being 
deemed to have imposed a second punishment 
for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis. 
These cases do not tell us, because the 
problem was not presented in them, what the 
Constitution commands when one of those 
imprecise formulas authorizes a supposedly 
remedial sanction that does not remotely 
approximate the Government's damages and 
actual costs, and rough justice becomes clear 
injustice. 
490 U.S. at 446. 
Halper created a rule "for the rare case . . . where a 
fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge 
offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the 
damages he has caused." Id. at 449. 
The rule is one of reason: Where a defendant 
previously has sustained a criminal penalty 
and the civil penalty sought in the 
subsequent proceeding bears no rational 
relation to the goal of compensating the 
Government for its loss, but rather appears 
to qualify as "punishment" in the plain 
meaning of the word, then the defendant is 
entitled to an accounting of the Government's 
damages and costs to determine if the penalty 
sought in fact constitutes a second 
punishment. 
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Id. (footnote omitted). 
In other words, the only proscription 
established by our ruling is that the 
Government may not criminally prosecute a 
defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon 
him, and then bring a separate civil action 
based on the same conduct and receive a 
judgment that is not rationally related to 
the goal of making the government whole. 
Id. at 451 (footnote omitted). 
The fines in Halper were over $130,000 compared to less than 
$16,000 in government expenses and only $585 in actual losses by 
the government that had been shown. The United States Supreme 
Court remanded the matter to the trial court for an accounting of 
the actual costs and ordered the trial court to permit the 
government to recover its demonstrated costs. Id. at 452. 
The State of Utah agrees with the defendant that Halper 
provides the correct test to use in this instance, even though 
the civil proceeding in this case preceded the criminal 
prosecution. The order in which the proceedings occur is not 
important. United States v. Furlett. 974 F.2d 839, 843 n.2 (7th 
Cir. 1992) . 
Mendoza has never challenged the trial court!s finding of 
fact that the "fine" of $200 in this action was meant to 
reimburse the prison the cost of the disciplinary hearing and its 
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accompanying investigation and that it was not grossly 
disproportionate to that goal. 
Such a question is a factual issue, one that has been 
resolved against Mendoza in the triaj. court. United States v. 
Mayers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127 (11th Cir.), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 
865 (1990). Because Mendoza never challenged the amount of the 
"fine" as being disproportionate to the government's losses, he 
has failed to state a double jeopardy claim. 
A defendant must make a threshold showing of 
"punishment" before a court undertakes a 
double jeopardy analysis. In the context of 
a civil sanction, this threshold is met by 
showing the sanction to be overwhelmingly 
disproportionate to the government's damages 
and expenses. Leeway is given to achieve 
"rough justice" when computing the precise 
amount of damages and costs the government 
suffered. Only in the rare case where such 
disproportion is shown does the burden of 
accounting for its damages and costs fall on 
the government. 
United States v. Morgan. 51 F.3d 1105, 1115 (2nd Cir.), cert. 
denied, 116 S.Ct. 171 (1995) (citations omitted). 
In United States v. Barnette. 10 F.3d 1553 (11th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 115 S.Ct. 74 (1994), the Court found that a 
recovery that was slightly over three times the actual losses of 
the government did not constitute a second punishment but was 
still remedial in nature. 
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In United States v. Walker. 940 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1991), 
the Court rejected a claim that a penalty of $500 for a customs 
violation was a criminal punishment. The defendant in Walker 
claimed that the amount was excessive in that the customs check, 
that led to the discovery of the contraband and the imposition of 
the penalty, involved only one employee of the Customs Service 
working for less than one hour. In rejecting this claim, the 
Court took judicial notice of the financial burden of the 
associated with maintaining check points and administering the 
customs system. The Court found that the amount of the penalty 
bore a rational relationship to the government's costs. 
In United States v. McClinton. 98 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1996) 
found a $1,000 penalty imposed for a second customs violation to 
be remedial and not punitive in nature. 
Sanders claims that because he was assessed 
$1,000 that, surely, must make his assessment 
a punishment. We do not agree. Our decision 
in Walker applies just as clearly to a $1,000 
civil penalty as it does to a $500 civil 
penalty. Beyond that, Halper itself 
indicated that no exact determination of 
government costs is needed, for the 
determination is unavoidably imprecise and 
"inevitably involves an element of rough 
justice." Indeed, the concern of the Court 
in that case was that a multiplication of a 
large number of civil penalties could add up 
to punishment in a particular case. 
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In Halper, the government sought $2,000 plus 
double damages for each of 65 separate false 
claims. The overcharge in each of those 
claims was about $9. But the Court was not 
concerned at all about the fact that a mere 
$9 overcharge could draw a $2,000 penalty 
plus $18. It took that to be rationally 
related to making the government whole. In 
fact, lest it be misunderstood, the Court 
added: 
It hardly seems necessary to state that a 
suit under the Act alleging one or two false 
claims would satisfy the rational-
relationship requirement. It is only when a 
sizeable number of false claims is present 
that, as a practical matter, the issue of 
double jeopardy may arise. 
In other words, the Court meant what it said 
when it said that the rule it was announcing 
was "a rule for the rare case." This case is 
not a rarity. Of course, this is not to say 
that a single penalty can never be so 
"overwhelmingly disproportionate" that it 
constitutes punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes. Again, this is not that case. 
Id. at 1201 (citations omitted). 
Nor is the present action that case. The $200 restitution 
imposed in this matter is more proportional than either of the 
customs penalties upheld as remedial by the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals. Mendoza has never challenged the rationality of the 
penalty!s relationship to the remedial goal of reimbursing the 
State of Utah for its costs in the disciplinary hearing and its 
related investigation. The trial court's finding that the "fine" 
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in question was not "grossly disproportionate to the prison's 
remedial goals" (R. 60) should therefore be affirmed. 
III. MENDOZA'S RELIANCE ON TESTS OTHER THAN 
THAT ESTABLISHED IN HALPER IS ERRONEOUS 
Mendoza presents this Court with numerous tests as to what 
is or is not punishment. The only test that is applicable to 
this case is that laid down by the United States Supreme Court in 
Halper. that was addressed in the prior argument. The 
defendant's reliance on these other tests is erroneous. 
Austin v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801 (1993), was not even 
a double jeopardy case. Instead, it involved the question of 
whether a civil in rem forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition on excessive fines. The Court expressly rejected the 
use of the Halper standard because of the differences in the two 
situations. Id. at 2812 n.14. Austin did not alter the Halper 
test, but rather simply cited Halper for the proposition that 
civil penalties can be punitive in nature. Id. at 2806. The 
test set out in Austin is n ot useful to this Court. 
The same is true of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
State v. a House & 1.37 Acres of Real Property. 886 P.2d 534 
(Utah 1994) . House did not seek to alter the Halper double 
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jeopardy test, but only implemented the guidelines of Austin in 
an action concerning a civil in rem forfeiture. 
Nor is the test created in Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. 
Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. 1937 (1994) applicable. The Court 
expressly stated that "Halpey's method of determining whether the 
exaction was remedial or punitive fsimply does not work in the 
case of a tax statute.1" and proceeded to create a different 
standard. Id. at 1948. 
The test established by this Court in State v. Arbon, 909 
P.2d 1270 (Utah App. 1996) is also not applicable. Arbon, set 
out a test for whether an administrative license suspension was 
punishment. This Court expressly rejected a strict application 
of Halper because its test for monetary sanctions was not 
appropriate. But in the present action, the question is one of a 
monetary sanction, and not an administrative license suspension. 
Mendoza's reliance on State v. Davis, 903 P.2d 940 (Utah 
App. 1995), cert, granted, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996), is also 
misplaced. Davis followed the erroneous decision of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. 
Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), rev!d. United States v. 
Ursery. 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996). The Ninth Circuitfs opinion was 
consolidated with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in 
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United States v. Ursery. 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd. 116 
S.Ct. 2135 (1996), for purposes of certiorari review in the 
United States Supreme Court. The decision in Ursery makes clear 
that the Halper test has not been changed and was not altered by 
Austin or any other decision. The continued validity of the 
Halper test is best shown by the recent decision of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. McClinton, 98 F.3d 
1199 (9th Cir. 1996). 
In Ursery the Court took pains to point out 
that we cannot mix and match bits and pieces 
of the three cases. It said that Halper was 
a fixed-penalty case and its "narrow focus" 
was limited to that kind of situation. 
Austin, it said, was an excessive fines 
Eighth Amendment case whose "categorical 
approach" was wholly distinct from the Halper 
approach. And Kurth Ranch was a tax case for 
which the analysis was, again, quite distinct 
from that of Halper. Thus, to conflate the 
analyses contained in these three disparate 
cases is to misread them. In short, neither 
Austin nor Kurth Ranch undermines Helper-
Id. at 1202. 
Defendant errs when he seeks to import various other tests 
into this action. The only test that this Court should use in 
determining whether the monetary sanction imposed at a prison 
disciplinary constitutes punishment is that set out in Halper. 
If the sanction is rationally related to the remedial purpose of 
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making the government whole for the loss and expense it has been 
put to, then the sanction is not punitive and no double jeopardy 
bar attaches to the civil proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, the trial court's order 
denying Mendoza's motion to dismiss should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND A PUBLISHED OPINION 
REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 
The State of Utah requests oral argument and a published 
opinion in this matter. The question of whether the imposition 
of restitution (or a "fine") by the Utah State Department of 
Corrections constitutes punishment should be clearly established 
under Utah, and federal, law and resolved by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted this / V day of December, 1996. 
<£? 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH# SANDY DIVISION 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 941000329 MS 
Judge Livingston 
This matter comes before this court on Defendant's motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that he is being subjected to multiple 
punishments in violation of the double jeopardy clauses of the 
United States and Utah Constitutions. Specifically Defendant 
claims he was "punished" within the meaning of double jeopardy 
following an administrative disciplinary hearing at the Utah State 
Prison. The Defendant was represented by Janet Miller, the State 
was represented by District Attorney Neal Gunnarson, Deputy 
District Attorney Blake Nakamura# and Assistant Attorney General, 
Frank D. Mylar, representing the Utah Department of Corrections 
(UDC) . 
After reviewing memoranda submitted by all parties, the 
affidavit of Terry Bartlett, Director of Institutional Operations 





for the UDC, and hearing oral argument of the parties, the court 
now enters the following findings of fact and conclusion of laws: 
FINDINGS OP FACT 
1. On about August 7, ,1994, Defendant allegedly assaulted a 
Utah State Prison correctional officer with bodily fluids. 
2. After an administrative disciplinary hearing at the 
prison, Defendant was found in violation of prison rules and fined 
$200.00 and restricted to his cell for 30 days. 
3. As a separate and unrelated proceeding, Defendant is 
currently being prosecuted in this criminal court for Assault on a 
Correctional Officer, a Class A Misdemeanor, arising out of the 
same alleged assault of August 7, 1994. 
4. Prison officials discipline inmates to assist in 
rehabilitation and to maintain a safe, secure, and orderly managed 
institution. (See Affidavit of Terry Bartlett, 1 2) . 
5. The disciplinary process at the Utah State Prison is 
essential to assist prison officials in managing the behavior of 
convicted felons by determining whether prison rules are broken. 
If rules are broken, the prison uses this information to assess the 
inmate's security classification and rehabilitative needs. 
(Affidavit of Bartlett, f 3). 
6. Fines that are assessed following a disciplinary 
conviction are no more than $200.00 and go towards reimbursing the 
prison the costs of the hearing, including investigation costs when 
2 
applicable. Additional monetary amounts may be charged to the 
inmate to reimburse the prison for property damage or related 
costs. (Affidavit of Bartlett, 1 4) . 
7. Monetary judgments and fines, as well as punitive 
isolation (i.e. restrictions from privileges through confinement in 
onefs cell), also serve to encourage proper inmate behavior and 
rehabilitate the inmate. (Affidavit of Bartlett, 1 5) . 
8. The disciplinary hearing process at the Utah State Prison 
is a civil administrative process and not criminal in nature. 
9. The administrative discipline received by Defendant of 30 
days of restriction to his cell and a fine of $200.00 was not 
"grossly disproportionate to the prison's remedial goals." 
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW 
Based upon the above findings of fact, the court now enters 
the following conclusions of law: 
1. The administrative discipline received by Defendant of 30 
days of restriction to his cell and a fine of $200.00 was not 
"punishment" within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause of the 
United States or Utah constitutions. 
2. The Defendant is not being subjected to "multiple 
punishments." 
3. The Defendant is not being subjected to double jeopardy. 
3 
GEEEB 
Based upon the above findings of- fact and conclusions of law, 
the court now makes the following ORDER: 
Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied. 
DATED this day of 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on April 19, 1995, I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, an exact copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss to: 
Janet Miller 
Elizabeth Bowman 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Blake Nakamura 
Deputy District Attorney 
E. Neal Gunnarson 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
2001 South State Street, S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210 
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